The procedures by which standards are set to regulate human exposure to foreign substances and radiation rarely conform to any ideal exemplar. The scientific data used in the decision-making process seldom lead to one set of interpretations, nor do they provide the clear lines of demarcation (as between hazardous and safe exposure levels) that standards are taken to imply. The procedures recent enough to allow consultation with most of the principal parties and clear access to the surviving written record. Third, since the controversy over microwave exposure continues today, a survey of its history has direct and real links with the present. Finally, since historical considerations are influencing decisionmaking in the microwave area (2), we believe that this article will aid in the cur- Summary. An analysis is made of the scientific research and values influencing the policy decisions that led to the adoption of the 1966 U.S. standard for exposure to microwave radiation. This analysis is used as a tool for understanding the problems faced by those who set standards. An effort is made to unravel the complex motivations that lay behind the adoption of the microwave standard. Based on the past record, it is suggested that standard setting remain distinct from basic scientific re- search and that adversary procedures be used only as a last resort in seeking consensus over a proposed standard.
used to reconcile scientific data and social demands-such as risk-benefit analysis or conferences-are themselves the subject of dispute. In sum, standard setting is a complex process that frequently raises as many difficulties as it solves; seldom does it eliminate the problems it was intended to resolve.
Given the problematic nature of procedures used to set biological exposure standards, it is instructive to look at past experiences and draw generalizations that may apply to the present. To this end we investigated the history of the process that led to the adoption in 1966 of 10 milliwatts per square centimeter as the standard for maximum safe exposure to microwave radiation (U.S. Standard C95. , which we will refer to simply as C95.1) (1) .
The microwave case is an ideal one to study for several reasons. First, it embodies most of the elements that make standard setting problematic, such as disputed or insufficient scientific data, vested interests, ill-defined political mechanisms, unrepresented values, and so on. Second, the events involved are rent reappraisal of the microwave standard and perhaps of other standards as well.
We began our study by locating all relevant published literature. Then, through telephone conversations, questionnaires, and personal interviews, we pieced together the steps by which the scientific information presented in the literature was used to support the standard. Our efforts were aided greatly by extensive unpublished documentation that we unearthed during the course of our research.
Establishing the Standard
The main events leading to the adoption of C95. 1 NRL (3) , the National Defense Research Council (Division 14), the Aero Medical Laboratory of the Air Technical Service Command, and the Army Air Field at Boca Raton, Florida (4) , revealed no such effects. There was, in the opinion of those investigating the problem, no cause for alarm. Accordingly, during the remainder of the war numerous directives were issued that recommended caution in cases of prolonged overexposure, but no general guidelines were established. Within the context of the war effort, radar microwaves were universally regarded as beneficial.
When the war came to an end, microwave equipment developed during the war, such as the Raytheon microtherm, became available to medical researchers for studying and improving diathermy (treatment by selectively heating the body with radio-frequency radiation). As a result, the prewar interest in the therapeutic use of radio waves-now as microwaves-replaced the search for hazards, and the need for a standard was ignored. Well into the 1950's, most medical researchers believed that microwaves, if used with caution, were "'apparently a safe, convenient and comfortable form of heating for local application to tissues" (5) .
Although there was very little active research on microwave hazards after the war, some were discovered. In 1948, researchers at the Mayo Clinic reported the first confirmed deleterious effects resulting solely from microwave exposure-cataract formation in dogs (6) . Simultaneously, researchers supported by military sources also reported a possible link between microwaves, cataracts, and testicular degeneration in dogs (7) . This figure) and absorbing about one-third of the radiation coming from a source would absorb nearly as much energy as he can eliminate through normal body functions under normal conditions (11) . After considering this estimate and the implications that could be drawn from the few experiments that had been conducted, the group agreed that if a safety factor of 10 were built in, then 0.1 W/cm2 represented a reasonable first approximation of the dividing line between safe and hazardous exposures. With some dissent [several members sought higher or lower first approximations (12)], this guideline was adopted.
That more than a decimal point had indeed been misplaced was soon discovered by one of the participants, Herman Schwan, a biophysicist at the Moore School of Engineering. In a memorandum sent to the Office of Naval Research, Schwan estimated that the amount of heat the body dissipates under normal conditions is 100 W, not 150 W; and that the absorbing surface of the body was actually 20,000 cm2. He also discounted the one-third absorption factor. Putting these figures together, he estimated normal heat loss to be 0.005 W/ cm and concluded that ""a UHF-radiation intensity of 0.1 W/cm2 supplies per 13 JUNE 1980 (14) . Reflecting on these data, which had been mentioned in passing at the Navy conference, the researchers at General Electric decided, on 1 June 1954, that if damage could occur at 0.1 W/cm2, then a safety factor of 100 should be built in and the guidelines for exposure set at I mW/cm2 (15) . In November 1953, the Central Safety Committee of Bell Telephone had taken an even more conservative stand and adopted a 0.1 mW/cm2 guideline based on a safety factor of 1000 (16) . Thus by late 1954, both industry and the military agreed that 0.1 W/cm2 represented a known point at which injury might occur. Where opinion differed was over the margin of safety that should be adopted.
The guidelines set by the military and industry after the renewal of concern in early 1953 were not intended to provide long-range solutions to the problem of determining safe levels of exposure to microwaves. Participants at the Navy conference stressed on several occasions the need for more data (17), a need that has been reiterated ever since. Instead, the initial guidelines were intended to provide the best "conservative" estimates of safe exposure levels that could be used to set policy until sufficient data were assembled to confirm or deny them. As a consequence, the major power behind the development of microwave technology, the military, began sponsoring research on the biological effects of microwave radiation. (19) of Collins Radio in 1950. In response to early reports of hazards, he had suggested that "it would be highly desirable in the light of these observations to set about establishing standards for the protection of personnel exposed to intense microwave radiation before anyone is injured. We have here a most unusual opportunity to lock the barn door before, rather than after, the horse is stolen" (19, p. 3). However, such was not the course of events that followed. Despite claims to the contrary, the TriService program did not in any formal way address itself to the problem of the standard. The information it obtained remained simply that, information, as the burden of the standard-setting process came to rest more and more on the Navy and, to lesser extent, on some industrial factions.
As early as 31 August 1957-less than a year after the first Tri-Service conference-the Chief of Naval Operations, following the orders of an "'ad hoc working group" within the Department of Defense, ordered the Bureau of Ships to conduct hazards tests for microwave exposure. By 4 June 1958, this order was confirmed by the Department of Defense and broadened to include responsibility for setting a standard. In December 1958 the microwave problem was divided into three subfields-fuels, personnel, and equipment-each of which remained un-*der the control of the Bureau of Ships. The subfield of personnel, which included the actual setting of the standard, was then once again assigned to ARDC at Rome, New York, thus bringing at least this portion of the Tri-Service bio-hazards program loosely under Navy control. On 4 May 1959, the Bureau of Ships expanded the base of its standard-setting operation by turning to the American Standards Association (ASA) for help, thereby ensuring the involvement of industry. One month later, ASA (now the U.S. Standards Institute) formally agreed to aid in the standard-setting process by establishing a sectional committee, designated C95, under the joint sponsorship of the Bureau of Ships and the American Institute of Electrical Engineers (AIEE) (20) .
Despite Navy prodding, ASA committee C95 pursued its objectives very slowly and sometimes with a good deal of contention. It took them 6 months to choose a chairman (Herman Schwan), and his appointment was only reluctantly accepted by AIEE (21) . At the first meeting (15 February 1960) , it was planned that within a year initial reports would be presented by the six subcommittees that had been set up. However, it was not until 24 April 1962 that the committee reassembled to discuss progress. In the interim, the Bureau of Ships had taken over primary responsibility for running C95, with AIEE becoming cosponsor and "'advisor." Thereafter, due mostly to the efforts of chairman Schwan, C95 began to meet more regularly. By 1966, three of its subcommittees' reports, one of which was the report of Subcommittee IV on the standard, were submitted to the members for a vote.
After 1960, Subcommittee IV became the most important and visible group concerned with setting microwave standards. Like the parent committee, it proceeded to its goal very slowly. During the first 2 years of its existence ( With the drafting of C95. 1, the work of Subcommittee IV was still far from over. The process of getting the proposed standard accepted proved difficult, not because there were objections but because some of the members of C95 were dilatory in voting. (The rules of ASA require that its standards be approved by a three-fourths vote of the active membership of the committees that are set up to establish them.) By January 1965, 8 months after ballots had been mailed and 7 months after the deadline for submitting votes, only 31 of the 52 members had voted. Finally, by limiting the voting membership of C95 to 41, the committee tallied a final vote of 38 yes and 3 "not returned," and forwarded to ASA its report, which was accepted as U.S. Standard C95.1-1966 on 9 November 1966-1 year and a few days after Schwan relinquished the chairmanship of C95 itself.
That the adoption of C95. 1 would not settle the problem of the microwave-exposure standard was evident almost immediately. In December 1966, Glenn Heimer wrote to John Gerling, president of the newly formed International Microwave Power Institute, informing him that at the last C95 meeting it had been suggested that a second standard would be needed for the general public; that is, for those who might have regular, nonoccupational exposure to microwaves. Heimer suggested that his second standard might fall "in the neighborhood of 1 mW/cm2 for continuous exposure" (22) . At roughly the same time, the U.S. Army Electronics Command at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, sent a letter to the Naval Ship Engineering Center indicating that "C95. 1-1966 is not concurred in" primarily because of difficulties in implementation (23) .
Thus adoption of C95.1 did not represent the end of the debate. Instead, it was the beginning of an era during which the debate for the first time became publicly focused on a particular estimate of the "safe" exposure level.
The Scientific Basis for Concern
As drawn up and adopted, C95. 1 was intended to reflect the best approximation of safe microwave exposure levels for those exposed occupationally (not the general public). The scientific data upon which it was based were of three types: (i) clinical studies and personnel surveys, (ii) animal experiments, and (iii) research on anomalistic effects. The major question that arises concerning these data is, was there sufficient evidence available at the time C95.1 was set to justify its acceptance or cast doubt on its validity (24) ?
The most elusive and yet potentially the most useful of the three groups of data are surveys of personnel who were exposed to radar microwaves. This fact was recognized early in World War II and led to two studies. These studies gave no cause for concern. In his 1943 survey, Daily (3) concluded that "there has been no clinical evidence of damage to these personnel"; and in their 1945 survey, Lidman and Cohn (25) found "'no evidence" of abnormalities. In sum, the personnel studies conducted during World War II led most to dismiss the rumors that associated radar with health hazards.
The influence these studies exerted in subsequent years certainly cannot be attributed to the weight of their scientific evidence. They were extremely superficial. The Daily study reported no urinalysis or blood chemistry data of any kind. Moreover, its conclusion that there were ".no significant changes" was not justifiable on the basis of the data presented. A statistically significant increase in the concentration of immature red blood cells was found in exposed workers, as was a high incidence of headaches. Therefore, had researchers been interested in finding grounds to conduct more extensive surveys of personnel, it is clear that a case could have been made.
The inadequacies of the early personnel studies were recognized as soon as the microwave problem reemerged in the early 1950's. McLaughlin noted that "the early work done by the Navy and the AAF [Army Air Force] was not extensive, the power used was very small, the work was not quantitative in character, and the controls were inadequate. Therefore, this work cannot be relied upon as scientific background to establish the possible health hazards of microwave radiation" (9, p. 6). However, despite McLaughlin's prodding, the quantity and quality of personnel studies did not increase very much. The topic came up on several occasions at the Navy conference, always with the clear understanding that more data had to be forthcoming (26). The industry representatives at the conference indicated that "Philco, General Electric, RCA Victor, were all anxious to cooperate to do whatever they can, but they are all standing by waiting for someone else here to make the move" (27) . This willingness notwithstanding, the "Cook's Tour" approach to the hazards problem called for at the Navy conference seems never to have been launched, since only a handful of personnel studies appeared in print over the next decade.
The few personnel studies made during the middle and late 1950's presented contradictory conclusions. Beginning in 1954, researchers at Lockheed Aircraft reported some blood abnormalities, but these findings were dismissed in a later article as "due to a variation of interpretation by a laboratory technician." With this error eliminated, the conclusion of the final Lockheed study was that "there appears to be no justification for public concern about the effects of greatly attenuated microwave energy in the environment" (28) . Milton Zaret, who conducted a controlled search for ocular damage, was far less certain about the safety of microwaves. While failing to uncover any "reduction of visual acuity due to cataracts," Zaret did report "'statistically significant increases in the occurrence of posterior polar defects, luminescence, and early opacification" (29, 30) . These changes were sufficient to prompt Zaret to continue his work by surveying larger populations.
In combination, the early personnel studies led to no clear course for further action. Such "meager human data," as Michaelson characterized the findings, raised as many questions as they settled and were of little use in setting a standard (31, 32) . As a result, most of the evidence eventually used to set C95. 1 was drawn from animal studies and related biophysical calculations.
The animal studies, although more extensive and better controlled than the personnel surveys (especially during the Tri-Service era), also did not provide conclusive evidence either in support of or against the 10 mW/cm2 guideline. Animals were exposed to radiation under controlled conditions and studied for any ill effects. The experimental parameters, such as frequency and animal species, were specified by the Tri-Service program personnel, and the work was subcontracted out to university researchers. Ideally, from such controlled experi- 13 JUNE 1980 (33) .
The weight of these experiments in support of the safety of the proposed guideline led some to conclude that the Tri-Service program had settled the issue. Colonel Knauf had reached this conclusion by the beginning of the fourth and final Tri-Service conference, when he noted that "'up to today we have not seen any research data which shakes our faith in the validity of this arbitrary safe exposure level which we sponsored some five years ago" (34). Knauf repeated this opinion many times during the course of the deliberations leading to the establishment of C95.1. A similar view was set forth by Michaelson in his retrospective appraisal of the Tri-Service era, noting that the most important contribution of the program was "'the validation of the 10 mW/cm2 safety standard" (35) . Others who looked back on the research of the 1950's made more extensive claims. In a letter from the Raytheon Company to Senator Warren G. Magnuson, dated 31 August 1967, it was contended that the Tri-Service program had led to "three basic conclusions": the biological effects involved were (i) thermal, (ii) noncumulative, and (iii) of little concern since "man has a built-in alarm system coupled with his threshold of pain that protects him from thermal injury" (36).
Although widely accepted, this view of conditions at the end of the Tri-Service era was not unanimous. There were doubts about the current state of microwave research. First, the experimental techniques used were such that findings were seldom duplicated and frequently questioned. Second, although not as numerous as the studies that reported no irreversible effects above 10 mW/cm2, experiments had been conducted in which ill effects at or near this level were found. Third, although almost all of the research conducted before 1966 was based on the assumption that only thermal effects should be expected, anomalistic findings were reported that supported the view that mechanisms other than thermal ones could be involved.
The technical shortcomings of the early animal studies were particularly apparent in two areas. First, dose levels were not reported in many of the earliest studies, and even when they were, it was often on the basis of source output and not field intensities or absorption by tissues. Further confusion arose from possible differences between pulsed and continuous-wave radiation at similar intensities. Second, even though exposure of personnel under field conditions was of long duration and very low intensity, few animal studies involving long-term exposure to low-level radiation were undertaken. In most of the early experiments, intensities well above 10 mW/ cm2 and exposure periods of a few hours or days were used.
These problems did not go unrecognized. As late as the fourth Tri-Service conference, papers were presented that discussed "experimental instrumentation considerations ... which are intended to result in more reproducible and more quantitative measurements of biological effects of microwave energy" (37) . The unmistakable message of these papers was that defects in procedure stood in the way of a full understanding of the exposure levels at which damage appeared.
However, it is not simply disagreement over the reliability of data that has led some to be skeptical about the safety of exposure to 10 mW/cm2. By 1960, when the Tri-Service program came to an end, there were studies in which deleterious effects at or near 10 mW/cm2 were reported. Researchers at the School of Aerospace Medicine found testicular damage in rats at levels as low as 30 to 40 mW/cm2, a figure that was lowered by Ely and Goldman (38) 
, "I want you and the IEEE Committee to be assured that this documentation has required considerable effort and negotiation. We feel that a fine standard has been achieved and that insistence on the replacement of the word 'recommendation' by 'standard' will probably indefinitely delay a microwave health standard" (49) . It had taken more than 7 years to progress from the initial orders to the draft proposal of 1963. That only three more years were required for the draft to be adopted can only be accounted for by the conviction and energy of Schwan and others like him. But having persons of unusual conviction and energy in key decision-making roles has counterproductive as well as productive consequences. In this case, the most important counterproductive consequence was the neglect of competing points of view (the anomalistic and other contradictory scientific evidence) during the push to get the standard set. Schwan voiced dissatisfaction about these restrictions at the end of the first Tri-Service conference, when he suggested that "there was no opportunity to thrash things out" (50) . The same frustration was felt by many who attended the Tri-Service conferences and continued with the effort thereafter. Allan Frey's (51) recollection of an early Subcommittee IV meeting chaired by Schwan (who was now in an organizational role) is one of a brief, pro forma get-together at which the claim was repeated that no evidence had yet been found to cast doubt on the guideline of 10 mW/cm2. At other Subcommittee IV meetings, Schwan repeatedly reminded members that "it is not the function of C95 and its working committees to undertake research in order to correct deficiencies in knowledge. Hence the working committees' primary task must be evaluation of pertinent information and formulation of standards which can be well supported by pertinent literature" (52) . The pressing need to set a standard did not leave time for extended debate over the issues.
In the push to set the standard, there can be no doubt that possible evidence against its safety was ignored and that research that might have clarified certain details was not undertaken. The actions of those who had the energy and conviction to pursue the problem displaced contradictory evidence that others, viewing the problem in retrospect, have 13 JUNE 1980 deemed important. However, to point to these shortcomings and label them the consequence of a conspiracy-the secret planning of an unlawful act-fails to appreciate the conditions that prevailed nearly two decades ago and at the same time misses some important lessons that can be learned through retrospective analysis.
Comments
In the social climate that prevailed in the United States for 20 years after the development of radar (and radar was virtually the only source of concern over microwaves until the marketing of microwave ovens), the decision-making process was not placed in the hands of persons whose primary responsibility was public health or environmental monitoring. The decision-makers were preoccupied with winning a major war, and then, during the first Cold War, with erecting a strong defense. Thus their decisions concerning microwave technology were necessarily made in the context of global or national security rather than that of individual welfare. Under extreme pressure, during war, lives are sacrificed for larger objectives. Under lesser pressure, during years of defense planning, lives may not be sacrificed, but neither is military preparation eliminated to reduce risk to zero. Basic training is not stopped when training accidents occur; the Air Force is not disbanded when crashes occur; and radar systems, which had not killed anyone who followed minimum security regulations, were not dismantled when headaches, blood disorders, and other problems appeared. No one was dying, and the persons who drew up and accepted the 10 mW/cm2 standard did not believe that this level of exposure was likely to cause any serious consequences in the foreseeable future.
The fact that C95. 1 was based on decisions made in good conscience does not dictate that it was the best standard that could have been established or that it was valid. Since C95. 1 is being revised, there apparently was room for improvement. Still, those who set standards must base their decisions on the knowledge and values of the time, and to condemn them later serves little purpose. Instead, one should attempt to learn from their example-in the case of C95.1, to discover how the decision-making processes might have been changed to avoid the resulting controversy and at the same time to allow decisions that have broader bases of support.
The fact that relatively few persons, with similar points of view, made most of the early decisions about the development of research and policy on the biological effects of microwave radiation obviously minimized and may even have eliminated input from other perspectives. To counter this tendency, decision-making processes are needed that will institutionalize mechanisms for dealing with many points of view. Not only the public, but scientists whose work falls outside the domain of normal science and persons of nonscientific persuasions, such as humanists, have a legitimate role to play in reaching decisions about standards that can affect human history.
Throughout the years that led to the setting of C95. 1, the motivation for microwave safety research derived mostly from the need for a standard; conversely, the need for a standard stemmed largely from the results appearing in the scientific literature. The research and standard-setting procedures were clearly intertwined, with most of the personnel involved in one activity also engaged in the other. This interttvining of activities ultimately does disservice to both communities.
When science becomes involved too deeply in the procedures of standard setting, it runs the risk of being diverted from its primary objective-understanding nature. Standard setting does not require detailed knowledge about mechanisms or explanations about anomalistic phenomena. To set a standard one simply needs to know at what level-for whatever reasons-harmful effects appear. To be sure, this is information that is properly supplied by basic science, but if research stops here, as it seems to have during the early years of microwave radiation research, then science is not well served by its involvement in applied research. The benefits of increased funding, which stem from involvement in mission-oriented research, must be carefully weighed against the risks of scientific misdirection that can follow.
At On 28 April, after 5 days of trial, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that a redesigned edition of Science Digest magazine had infringed on a registered trademark of the AAAS, the cover logo of Science magazine. Infringement first occurred in October 1979 when the Hearst Corporation published a "special edition" of Science Digest in which the word "Digest" on the cover had shrunk to 9 percent of the area occupied by the word "Science." In the regular edition of the magazine, both words are the same size. Hearst has so far published three issues of the special edition, which is slated to eventually replace the regular edition.
Throughout most of the trial, a copy of the special edition rested on a stand some 14 feet away from U.S. District Court Judge Joyce Hens Green, who in her 28-page opinion commented on the visibility of this exhibit. "Although abundantly cognitive of the true title of the magazine and the words which actually existed on the cover, and forcefully straining for a more neutralized perspective, the Court nonetheless continually found the word 'Digest' blurring into oblivion."
On the basis of this and a good deal of other evidence, Judge Green enjoined SCIENCE, VOL. 208, 13 JUNE 1980 Hearst from further publication of the special edition in its present form, ruling that the word "Digest" must in the future occupy at least 75 percent of the area occupied by the word "'Science." The case is one of the few in which a court had found trademark infringement on the basis of word size, rather than meaning.
During the trial, attorneys for the AAAS argued that Hearst had deliberately infringed on 
